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Abstract 
The idea that EU treaties have become too difficult to amend is a recurring one.  This article 
explores changing national constitutional rules and norms in the consent stage of EU treaty 
making in twenty-eight Member States  between 1950 and 2016 asking how parliaments, 
people and courts came to be much more significant for consent, what the consequences of 
this shift are, and offering some tentative proposals as to how the challenges this raises could 
be addressed. EU treaty making has become more complex, but we argue that treaties should 
be more rather than less difficult to amend where concerns over two-level legitimacy rather 
than two-level games predominate. 
Keywords: EU treaty-making, referendum, parliament, comparative constitutionalism, 
ratification, legitimacy 
 
I. INTRODUCTION – THE CHALLENGE OF CONSENT 
The European Union (EU) is founded on treaties to which Member States give their consent 
to be bound. Three actors have assumed a more prominent role in the process through which 
such consent is offered: parliaments, people and courts. Parliaments were pivotal actors in 
the approval of the Treaty of Paris, which in 1951 founded the first of the three European 
Communities, but they now play a much more visible role. The involvement of five regional 
parliaments and the federal parliament in Belgium is an extreme case.1 The people are now 
routinely offered a say, with ten Member States promising referendums on the failed 
European Constitution.2 National higher courts, especially Germany’s Federal Constitutional 
                                                          
* Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the European Union Studies Association conference, Denver 
2019, the Society of Legal Scholars conference Queen Mary London 2018,  UCD Sutherland School of Law 
research seminar and DCU School of Law and Government research seminar 2019. Thanks to participants for 
comments and to Ronan Riordan for able research assistance. The usual disclaimer applies. 
1 On the role of parliaments in EU treaty making, see C Closa, The Politics of Ratification of EU Treaties (Routledge, 
2013). 
2 F Mendez, M Mendez and V Triga, Referendums and the European Union: A Comparative Inquiry (Cambridge 
University Press 2014). 
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Court, have become familiar too in EU treaty making.3 The Article 136 TFEU amendment to 
establish a stability mechanism led to constitutional challenges in six Member States.4  
The idea that EU treaties have become too difficult to amend is a recurring one from European 
leaders. The fraught politics of approving the Lisbon Treaty, which emerged after the rejection 
of the Constitutional Treaty in referendums in France and The Netherlands and two 
referendums in Ireland, produced a plea of ‘no more treaties’ from UK Prime Minister Gordon 
Brown.5 Treaty-making was ‘taboo’ during the euro crisis, French President Emmanuel 
Macron later admitted, while remaining reluctant to be drawn on specific proposals for treaty 
amendment.6 Given the low likelihood that that EU treaties will remain unchanged – there 
have been more than 20 revisions since 1951 – there is strong scholarly support for  treaty 
making becoming more flexible. ‘In the light of comparative constitutional law and the 
practice of international organisations, the general procedure for amending the treaties is 
particularly rigid’, argued a high-level report on treaty amendment submitted by leading legal 
scholars to the European Commission in 2000.7 Vivien Schmidt makes a similar point when 
she criticises current treaty-making rules and norms for allowing some Member States ‘to 
hold the others hostage, delaying the entry into vigour of treaties approved by the others and 
often watering down measures desired by large majorities in futile attempts to engineer 
compromise’.8 Critical too is Carlos Closa, who argues that treaty revision procedures ‘are too 
rigid and, hence, that national governments are increasingly tempted to channel reform via 
treaties outside the EU’.9 
This article explores changing national constitutional rules and norms in the consent stage of 
EU treaty making in the twenty-eight Member States over the period 1950 and 2016.10 It 
examines how parliaments, the people and courts came to play a new role in this stage and 
what the consequences of changing consent practices were. Our findings confirm that EU 
treaty making became more complex but challenge the idea that treaty-making was too rigid 
as a consequence. The increased role of parliaments, the people and courts are associated 
with falling treaty amendment rates overall but treaty making by no means ground to a halt 
as a result of these changes, not least as governments were willing and able to circumvent 
such constraints. There is a neglected case for making treaties more rather than less difficult 
                                                          
3 M Mendez (2017) ‘Constitutional review of treaties: Lessons for comparative constitutional design and practice’ 
(2017) 15 (1) International Journal of Constitutional Law. 
4 These states are Austria, Estonia, Germany, Hungary, Ireland and Poland. 
5  ‘Brown rules out EU referendum as opponents begin 3-month battle to block treaty’ Evening Standard (14 
December 2007) 
6 Michel Rose, ‘France's Macron says EU treaty change “not taboo”’ Reuters Business News (15 May 2017) 
7 C D Ehlermann and Y Meny ‘Reforming the Treaties’ Amendment Procedures’ (2000) Florence: Robert Schuman 
Centre for Advanced Studies 9. 
8 V A Schmidt ‘Re‐Envisioning envisioning the European Union: Identity, democracy, economy’ (2009) 47 (s1) 
Journal of Common Market Studies 26–7. 
9 C Closa ‘Between a rock and a hard place: the future of EU treaty revisions’ (2014) 2 SIEPS European Policy 
Analysis 2. 
10 This article draws extensively on D Hodson and I Maher, The Transformation of EU Treaty Making: The Rise of 
Parliaments, Referendums and Courts Since 1950 (Cambridge University Press, 2018). At the time of writing the 
UK is still a member of the EU and hence is included in references to Member States save where otherwise stated. 
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to amend where concerns over two-level legitimacy rather than two-level games 
predominate. 
 
II. NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONAL RULES AND NORMS AND EU TREATY REVISION 
Treaty making begins with the negotiation and conclusion stages, in which agreement on a 
final text is sought and secured.11 Before a treaty can enter into force, it must pass through, 
what we call, the consent stage. Consent is sometimes equated with ratification, but 
ratification is just one of several means through which states can give their consent to be 
bound by a treaty.12  Other means include signature, the exchange of instruments constituting 
a treaty, acceptance, approval or accession or any other agreed means.13 Although the 
primary focus of our discussion is how national constitutional rules and norms have shifted in 
the consent stage of EU treaty making, comparable changes have taken place at the 
negotiation stage too. From the Single European Act onwards, the European Parliament 
gradually gained entry to intergovernmental conferences. The convention process was 
codified in the Treaty of Lisbon so representatives of the European Parliament and national 
parliaments are offered a seat in the initial stages of treaty negotiation alongside the heads 
of state and government and the Commission.14 The Treaty of Lisbon introduced ordinary and 
simplified revision procedures for amending EU treaties.15 The ordinary revision procedure is 
aimed at amendments that increase or reduce the competences conferred on the EU by 
treaties, although not exclusively so.16 The simplified revision procedure allows the European 
Council to draft treaty amendments without recourse to an intergovernmental conference or 
convention, but it cannot be used to increase the competences of the EU and it is limited to 
revisions concerning certain aspects of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(TFEU).17 Pringle addressed the question of whether EU leaders, when they changed Article 
136 TFEU to allow for the creation of a euro area stability mechanism, complied with the 
conditions laid down in the simplified revision procedure. The Court of Justice of the European 
Union was consequently drawn into the negotiation stage of treaty making for the first time. 
18 
                                                          
11 G Korontzis, ‘Making the Treaty’ in D.B. Hollis (ed) The Oxford Guide to Treaties (Oxford University Press, 2012) 
p. 185.  For this section see note 10 above, pp 1 - 34 
12 Ibid, pp. 195–201. 
13 Article 11, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. 
14 Even though the failed European constitution had been the first time the convention was used. See T 
Christiansen and C Reh, Constitutionalizing the European Union (Palgrave Macmillan, 2009) p 242; Article 48(3) 
TEU. The ECB also is consulted in relation to institutional changes in the monetary area. 
15 Article 48(1) TEU. 
16 Article 48(2–5) TEU. 
17 Article 48(6) TEU. 
18 Pringle v. Government of Ireland, C-370/12, EU:C:2012:756; Constitutional challenges were brought in Austria, 
Estonia, Germany, Hungary, Ireland and Poland see J-H Reestman, ‘Legitimacy through Adjudication: The SSM 
Treaty and the Fiscal Compact before the National Courts’ in T Beukers, B de Witte and C Kilpatrick (eds), 
Constitutional Change through Euro-Crisis Law (Cambridge University Press 2017) pp 243-78. 
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National constitutions typically set out rules governing the consent stage of treaty making.19 
In the context of EU treaties, three rules are of particular relevance. First, there are those 
concerning international treaties in general. Second, many Member State constitutions 
contain provisions specific to the EU treaties and third, where the proposed EU treaty is such 
as to require an amendment of the constitution then regard also has to be had to the 
provisions governing constitutional amendment. A specific issue that shapes the consent 
stage is whether or not the state is monist or dualist, as the former does not require legislation 
for treaties to enter into force in domestic law with treaties viewed as directly applicable.20  
When it comes to approving EU treaties, Member States have regard for norms as well as 
rules. For example in Ireland, referendums are required to amend the constitution but the 
norm emerged that referendums would be sought for new EU treaties.21 Constitutional 
norms, understandings, habits and practices that drive constitutional law,22 can be seen as 
precedents that are respected as deemed appropriate.23 These norms, practised by the 
powerful in society, are more than just accepted moral norms.24 They may be articulated in 
constitutions - or not. They may be enforceable by the courts – or not. Their meaning may 
change over time reflecting their evolutionary nature – or they may be very stable being seen 
as foundational to the constitution and the state. This section examines relevant 
constitutional rules and norms in all twenty-eight Member States over the period 1950-2016. 
It is necessary for the sake of comparability to make some simplifying assumptions about the 
role of parliaments, people and courts and these are explained in each sub-section below. 
III. PARLIAMENTS 
 
A. Constitutional Amendment 
One of the more difficult legal and political questions around consent for EU treaties by 
Member States is whether or not that treaty will necessitate a constitutional amendment.25 
Usually constitutional amendment rules are more stringent than treaty consent per se 
although this is not always the case. For example, under the Czech constitution, approval of 
a treaty that transfers certain powers to an international organization or institution requires 
                                                          
19 In the UK the rules were contained in legislation, see The European Union Act 2011.  There is no single 
constitutional document in the UK. 
20 Although legislation is sometimes required to bind the state internationally. See D Sloss, ‘Domestic Application 
of Treaties’ In D B Hollis (ed) Oxford Guide to Treaties (Oxford University Press, 2012) pp. 367-95. 
21 D Finke, ‘Domestic Politics and European Treaty Reform: Understanding the Dynamics of Governmental 
Position-Taking’ (2009) 10(4) European Union Politics 501. D. Hodson and I.Maher, ‘British Brinkmanship and 
Gaelic Games: EU Treaty Ratification in the UK and Ireland from a Two Level Game Perspective’ (2014) 16(4) The 
British Journal of Politics and International Relations 651 
22 AV Dicey, The Law of the Constitution, Oxford University Press 2013, p. 20. 
23 Jennings, 1967 quoted in R. Albert, ‘How unwritten constitutional norms change written constitutions’ Dublin 
University Law Journal, 2015, 38(2), pp. 387-148. Wiener also notes their appropriateness see A. Wiener, 
Contested meanings of norms: A research framework. Comparative European Politics, 2007, 5(1), 1–17. 
24 J Waldron, Are constitutional norms legal norms? Fordham Law Review (2006) 75(3) 1697. 
25 See generally L F M, Besselink, ‘The Kingdom of the Netherlands’ in L F M Besselink, et. al (eds), Constitutional 
Law of the EU Member States (Kluwer, 2014) pp 1187-241.  
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the same three fifths majorities in the houses of parliament as for a constitutional 
amendment.26  
Four observations can be made around the question of whether or not constitutional 
amendment arises as a result of EU treaty revision. First, there are those Member States 
whose constitutional norms do not require constitutional amendments for EU treaty-making, 
often because the constitution has been changed to introduce larger parliamentary majority 
requirements where powers are delegated under a treaty (Bulgaria,27 Denmark,28 Cyprus,29 
Italy,30 Malta,31 The Netherlands,32 Portugal,33 Romania,34 Slovakia,35 Slovenia,36 
Luxembourg,37 and  Sweden38). Second, there are those for whom constitutional amendment 
in connection with the EU treaties are rare (Belgium,39 Finland,40 Greece,41 Hungary42).  Third, 
there are those where constitutional amendment is more likely (Austria,43 Czech Republic,44 
                                                          
26 Article 10a Constitution of the Czech Republic. See also Article 23(1) of the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of 
Germany; C Closa, The Politics of Ratification of EU Treaties (Routledge, 2013) pp. 50-59. 
27 Articles 155 and 161 of the Constitution of Bulgaria.  
28 See section 20 Constitutional Act of Denmark. Constitutional amendments are rare, see T Knudsen and U 
Jakobsen, The Danish Path to Democracy, (Paper for the 2nd ECPR General Conference, Marburg, 18-21 
September 2003) p. 9. 
29 Due to the differences between the written constitution and the functional constitution as a result of the 
separation of Cyprus in 1974, it exceptionally did not amend its constitution to accede to the EU and constitutional 
amendment is not envisaged for future treaties. See Article 179(2) Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus; A 
Emilianides ‘Cyprus: Everything Changes and Nothing Remains the Same’ in S Farran, E Örücü and S P Donlan 
(eds), A Study of Mixed Legal Systems: Endangered, Entrenched or Blended (Ashgate  2014) p 236; See note 2 
above, p. 227-8.  
30 Constitutional Court of the Italian Republic judgment No. 183/1973 and F Fontanelli and G Martinico, 
‘Cooperative antagonists: The Italian Constitutional Court and the preliminary reference: Are we dealing with a 
turning point?’ (2008) Eric Stein Working Paper 5/2008 p. 3.  
31 Article 66 Treaty of Malta. The norm of not looking for constitutional amendment has been criticised, see A S 
Trigona, ‘A sham ratification’ Times of Malta (Malta, 10 July 2012) 
32 See Article 91(3) and Article 137 Constitution of the Kingdom of the Netherlands. The exception of course is the 
referendum around the European Constitution. If this is seen as introducing a new constitutional norm then The 
Netherlands would be categorized as constitutional amendments being rare. 
33 Articles 7 and 8 Constitution of the Republic of Portugal. 
34 Article 148(1) Constitution of Romania. 
35 A three-fifths majority is required for the delegation of powers by an international agreement which is the same 
majority for constitutional amendments. See Articles 7 and 84 Constitution of the Republic of Slovakia. 
36 The constitution was amended prior to accession removing the possibility of a referendum on EU Treaties.  A 
two-thirds majority has become the norm. See Article 3a Constitution of the Republic of Slovenia.  
37 They can take place after ratification see Article 114 Constitution of Luxembourg. See generally J Gerkrath 
‘Constitutional Amendment in Luxembourg’ in X Contiades (ed), Engineering Constitutional Change (Routledge, 
2012) p. 247. 
38 Chapters 4, 5, 8 and 10 of the Instrument of Government (1974, amended to 2015).  
39 Article 195 Constitution of Belgium; See also M Claes ‘Constitutionalizing Europe at its source: The ‘European 
clauses’ in the national constitutions: Evolutions and typology’ (2005) 24(1) Yearbook of European Law pp. 86, 97. 
C Behrendt ‘The Process of Constitutional Amendment in Belgium’ in X Contiades (ed) note 35 above, pp. 35-50. 
40 Article 73 Constitution of Finland. 
41 Article 110 Constitution of Greece and P K Spyropoulos and T Fortsakis, Constitutional Law in Greece (Kluwer 
Law International 2009) pp. 79-80. 
42 Articles E(4) and S(2) Fundamental Law of Hungary.   
43 See eg Article 44 of the Austrian Constitution, amended in 2013 so an explicit constitutional amendment is now 
required where a treaty is at odds with the constitution. 
44 Article 10a Constitution of the Czech Republic. See T Dumbrovsky ‘Constitutional Change through Crisis Law: 
Czech Republic’ (2014) European University Institute: Fiesole. The President has to consent to international 
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France,45 Ireland,46 and Spain47). There are those Member States where it is not clear when a 
constitutional amendment will be required as they have yet to be faced with or not yet found 
treaty changes to be of constitutional significance (Croatia,48 Estonia,49 Latvia,50 Lithuania51) 
or where the matter of approval remains contentious politically and legally (Poland52). The 
UK, because of its partially-written, wholly-uncodified constitutional is a special case, which 
goes some way towards understanding why EU treaty making proved some contentious in 
this Member States.53     
Thus, for the majority of Member States (sixteen) constitutional amendment is not required 
or is rare. Yet for several of these states the majorities required in parliament are the same 
as those required for constitutional amendment (of which more below).  For six Member 
States constitutional amendment is more likely for Treaty changes. There are then several 
Member States who joined the EU more recently where it is not yet settled when 
constitutional amendment might be required.  Hence it is necessary to look more closely as 
what is required even where constitutional amendment is not triggered by a proposed EU 
treaty in order to assess the challenge of consent. 
B. Consent beyond Constitutional Amendment 
Parliaments have increasingly had a role in consenting to international treaties and EU treaty 
making is part of this trend.54 The prominence of the parliament can be determined by 
whether the legislature must (1) be consulted; (2) approve by a simple or absolute majority; 
(3) approve by a three-fifths or two-thirds majority; or (4) whether a supermajority is 
required.55  Our focus is on the rules and norms rather than the particular composition of any 
                                                          
treaties and the President sought controversially, and ultimately unsuccessfully, to delay the ratification of the 
Lisbon Treaty. See D Marek and M Baum, The Czech Republic and the European Union (Routledge, 2010) p. 49.   
45 Article 54 Constitution of the French Republic. See note 1 above, p. 102. 
46 Article 29.5.1 Constitution of Ireland.   
47 Articles 95(1), 167 and 168 of the Spanish Constitution. The constitution was revised for the Maastricht Treaty 
to allow European citizens votes in municipal elections. See M Kumm and V F Comella ‘The primacy clause of the 
constitutional treaty and the future of constitutional conflict in the European Union’ (2010) 3 International Journal 
of Constitutional Law 475. 
48 Article 143 Constitution of Croatia. Article 140 allows for delegation of powers to international organisations, 
reducing the need for a constitutional amendment for EU treaty revision. 
49 Article 65 Constitution of the Estonian Republic; Section 126, Riigikogu Rules of Procedure and Internal Rules 
Act (2007); See note 2 above, p. 56. 
50 See Article 68 and 76 of the Constitution of Latvia. See also Z Rasnača, Constitutional Change Through Euro 
Crisis Law: Latvia (European University Institute, 2013). 
51 Articles 148 and 150 Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania.  In fact the constitutional amendment for the 
introduction was deemed to be unnecessary, see Case 22/2013, 24 January 2014. 
52 Article 89 and 90 Constitution of Poland; K Zwolski ‘Euthanasia, gay marriages and sovereignty: Polish 
ratification of the Treaty of Lisbon’ (2009) 5(3) Journal of Contemporary European Research 493. 
53 The European Union Act 2011 introduced referendums for many, but not all, Treaty revisions. 
54 See note 1 above, pp. 44-46. 
55 On the difficulty of constitutional amendment relative to majorities required for approval see the influential 
study of D S Lutz ‘Toward a theory of constitutional amendment’ (1994) 88(2) American Political Science Review 
p. 360. 
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legislature at the time of treaty making – it may well be the case that for a minority 
government even a simple majority may be a difficult if not insurmountable obstacle.56   
All constitutions in the Member States have rules and norms pertaining to treaty approval 
and all of them have a role for their national parliaments. There are three main themes in 
determining the challenge for the government of securing consent. These are first, whether 
the parliament is unicameral or not, with the challenge of securing consent increasing with 
the number of chambers involved. Second, whether unicameral or not, the size and nature of 
the vote required to secure consent is important. Finally, there may also be subnational 
parliaments and whether their consent is also required can also pose a challenge. 
There are fifteen unicameral parliaments in the EU-28, seven of which have constitutional 
norms and rules that require approval for an EU treaty by a simple majority.57 Two Member 
States, Greece and Slovakia, require a three fifths majority. Six Member States require two 
thirds majority58 and Sweden requires a three quarters majority. The remaining thirteen 
Member States have bicameral legislatures. Of these, six Member States require only a simple 
majority in each House.59 Austria and Germany requires a two thirds majority of both Houses 
of Parliament. Romania requires a similar majority but with both Houses sitting jointly while 
Slovenia limits the two thirds majority to the lower House. Finally, the Czech Republic requires 
a three fifths majority in both Houses.  Finally, two Member States have subnational 
parliaments that have a role to play. In Finland, the Åland Islands parliament must consent to 
any EU treaty that falls within its competence in order for that treaty to take effect within the 
islands. However, once the Finnish parliament approves the treaty it does not have to wait 
for the Åland Islands parliament.60 Belgium has moved from being a unitary to a federal state 
and as a result of various constitutional reforms, treaty-making powers have extended to the 
subnational parliaments where the treaty involves issues falling within their competence 
(which is the case for most treaties).  
National Parliaments have grown more prominent since the 1950s with a significant increase 
recorded in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Ten parliamentary chambers gave their consent 
to the Treaty of Paris setting up the European Coal and Steel Community among six Member 
States. By 2016, forty-four parliamentary chambers are involved in approving EU treaties, 
reflecting the increased number of Member States but also the growing involvement of 
parliaments in agreeing to EU treaties. Hence even among the six original Member States only 
two have retained the requirement of a simple majority: Italy and the Netherlands. The 
practice of acceding states differ. For Greece (1981), Austria, Finland and Sweden (1995), a 
three fifths majority, a two-thirds majority in both Houses, a two thirds majority and a three 
                                                          
56 For a study of this nature see S Hug and T. König ‘In view of ratification: Governmental preferences and domestic 
constraints at the Amsterdam Intergovernmental Conference’ (2002) 56(02) International Organization p. 454. 
57 Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta and Portugal. In Denmark, treaties that do not transfer 
sovereignty – or more accurately that do not delegate powers ‘vested in the authorities of the Realm’ – are passed 
by a simple majority. Treaties entailing such a transfer can be approved by Parliamentary channels alone by five-
sixths of the members of the Folketing. 
58 Bulgaria (although if it were to be viewed as a constitutionally amending Treaty then a three quarters majority 
would be required), Croatia, Denmark, Finland, Hungary and Luxembourg. 
59 Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Slovenia, Spain and the United Kingdom. 
60 Section 58 Act on the Autonomy of Åland 1991/1144. 
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quarters majority were required respectively. Post-2005, a range of majorities were required 
showing no particular pattern but parliaments all have a say.  
IV. PEOPLE 
Prospective or existing EU Member States account for more than one third of foreign policy 
referendums in the world held since 1972.61 In studying the evolution of the constitutional 
rules and norms that determine whether or not referendums can be called, it is important to 
note the possibility of a referendum as this can act as a constraint on negotiation even if a 
referendum never actually takes place.62 Portugal is the only Member State that prohibited a 
referendum until it changed its constitution in 1997. Following this change, its Constitutional 
Court twice rejected calls for referendums on the Amsterdam Treaty and the European 
Constitution on the basis the question posed did not lend itself to the clarity required for a 
yes/no answer. A further constitutional amendment means such that a referendum is now 
possible but has never been called.63  
Referendums are improbable in six Member States ie there are rules allowing for them but 
they are unlikely to be called.64 Belgium seems to be the only Member State that is not moving 
towards greater use of referendums65 Under statute, a referendum can be called in Cyprus 
on any matter of public interest. There is no such provision in this Member State’s 
constitution and, given the unusual circumstances pertaining there, a referendum on an EU 
treaty would be improbable especially as Cyprus joined the EU without holding one.66 
Referendums on treaties are expressly prohibited in the Estonian constitution but changes to 
the constitution require a referendum. To date, no referendum has been sought for an EU 
treaty so it is improbable but not prohibited given an EU treaty might be viewed as changing 
the constitution.67 In Germany, a referendum is required for a constitution freely adopted by 
the people and a recurring issue of debate is when/whether an EU treaty will be proposed 
will be such as to require a free decision of the people given its impact on the existing Basic 
Law.  This makes a referendum improbable but not impossible.68 In Hungary, a  referendum 
can be called by the National Assembly on any matter falling within its functions and powers. 
This constitutional provision has not yet been invoked in relation to an EU treaty rendering a 
referendum improbable.69 Finally, the Italian constitution prohibits a referendum being called 
                                                          
61 Calculation based on the Centre for Research on Direct Democracy database available at www.c2d.ch   
62 E R Gerber and S Hug ‘Legislative Response to Direct Legislation’ in M Mendelsohn and A Parkin (eds) 
Referendum Democracy (Springer, 2001) pp 88-108; G Majone ‘The ‘referendum threat’, the rationally ignorant 
voter, and the political culture of the EU’ (2009) University College Dublin Law Research Paper 4 17-18. 
63 Portuguese Constitutional Court Decision 531/98 and 704/2004. The new provision is Article 295 of the 
Constitution of Portugal. 
64 Belgium, Cyprus, Estonia, Germany, Hungary and Italy. 
65 M Qvortrup  A Comparative Study of Referendums: Government by the People (Manchester University Press 
2005) p. 1. 
66 Cyprus, Law on Referendums 208/1989. 
67 See Articles 106 and 163 Constitution of the Estonian Republic.    
68 Article 146 Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany. See also German Federal Constitutional Court, 
Judgment of the Second Senate 30 June 2009 - 2 BvE 2/08. 
69 Article 8(3) Fundamental Law of Hungary. There were two unsuccessful challenges to not having a referendum 
on the Lisbon treaty and the European Constitution. See Constitutional Court of Hungary, Decision No. 61/2208 
and Decision no. 6/2005 (I.13). See also note 2 above, p. 82. 
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on an international treaty. The President is also curtailed from calling one if the treaty has 
been approved by parliament. A referendum on amending the constitution could be held but 
this has not happened to date rendering such a referendum improbable.70 
By far the largest category is those Member States where a referendum is possible mainly 
because the EU treaty may be deemed to amend the constitution – usually by delegating 
authority. Twenty states fall within this category.71 The trend has generally been towards 
allowing the possibility of a referendum.72 A referendum can be binding and non-binding.73 
They can be called on the strength of a public petition, which can be constrained as one 
element of the process allowing for a referendum to be called or can be a recent 
constitutional development. There can be a threshold for the majority required eg under the 
Croatian constitution the requirement went from 50% of the electorate to the less demanding 
50% of those voting must support the question.74 Some constitutions are vague as to the 
circumstances as to when a referendum might be invoked with no statute underpinning the 
empowering constitutional provision.75 Different actors can trigger a referendum76 and calls 
for referendums can be rejected.77 Denmark has had the largest number of referendums 
(eight) since accession in 1972.  Referendums can be called for international treaties or, for 
any bill (including one requiring a referendum on a treaty) with the rules long predating the 
EU.78 However, it does not always have one and a referendum is not inevitable. 
The smallest category is that where referendums are probable, and hence most likely, with 
only two Member States: Ireland and the UK. A referendum has never been held on an EU 
treaty per se in the UK, but only on whether or not to remain a member.79 However, the 2011 
European Union Act did allow for referendums on new EU treaties but was never invoked. For 
                                                          
70 Article 11, 75 and 78(6) Constitution of the Italian Republic. 
71 Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, 
Malta, The Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain and Sweden. 
72 For example, in France referendums became possible under the 5th Republic, see Article 11 Constitution of the 
Republic of France. In Greece Article 44(2) of the Constitution of the Republic of Greece, which allows for 
referendums, has gained traction following the fiscal crisis, see J Ungerer and L Ziaka, ‘Reflections on the Greek 
capital controls: How the rescue of the national economy justifies restricting private business’, (2017) 44(2) Legal 
Issues of Economic Integration 135 – 49. In 2003 Article 114 of the Constitution of Luxembourg introduced a 
referendum for constitutional amendment - which may be required in relation to an EU treaty. The Dutch 
introduced a popular petition for a referendum in 2015, see the Advisory Referendum Act (Wet raadgevend 
referendum) 2015. 
73 See eg Article 43 and Article 49b Constitution of Austria; A Pelinka and S Greiderer ‘Austria: The Referendum as 
an Instrument of Internationalisation’ in P V Uleri and M Gallagher (eds) The Referendum Experience in Europe 
(Springer, 1996) pp. 20–32. Sweden allows for both binding and non-binding referendums favouring the latter 
see U Bernitz ‘Sweden and the European Union: On Sweden’s implementation and application of European law 
(2001) 38(4) Common Market Law Review 903–34. 
74 Article 87 Constitution of Croatia. 
75 See eg Article 10A Constitution of the Czech Republic. 
76 See eg Article 68 Constitution of Latvia which allows the parliament to call a referendum provided half of its 
members vote for it and there are to be substantial changes to Latvia’s membership of the EU.  Article 90 of the 
Constitution of Romania allows the President to call a referendum on matters of national interest (which could of 
course include an EU treaty). 
77 See Article 3a Constitution of Slovenia. A petition by voters to call a referendum on the Lisbon treaty failed as 
there were not enough signatures. 
78 Sections 20 and 42 the Constitutional Act of Denmark.  
79 See R(Miller) v. Secretary of State [2017] UKSC 5. 
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Ireland the constitutional norm developed of having a referendum for EU treaties following a 
Supreme Court ruling that any treaty that altered the essential scope or objectives of the 
Communities would require a referendum.80  
For seventeen Member States, the question of referendum arises because it is required for 
constitutional amendment and an EU treaty may be deemed to constitute such an 
amendment.81  This may be in addition to other provisions allowing for referendums.82 Even 
if a referendum is prohibited for treaties, if the treaty constitutes an amendment of the 
constitution then a referendum may become necessary to agree to an EU treaty.83 Sometimes 
the question of a referendum only arises where there is a total revision of the constitution 
but there is the possibility that an EU treaty may be deemed to necessitate such a revision.84 
On average, referendums have become possible in th EU, having previously been improbable, 
leading Qvortrup to note that referendums have become the bargaining chip of choice for EU 
treaty-making.85 
V. COURTS 
Constitutional review has grown with 83 per cent of the world’s constitutions permitting it in 
2011 compared to only 38 per cent doing so in 1950.86 Similarly in the context of EU treaty-
making, constitutional review has also become more evident with seven challenges to the 
Lisbon Treaty.87  We are concerned with the extent to which there is ex ante constitutional 
review of EU treaties as a means through which political actors can realise their political 
objectives via securing delay or derailment of the EU treaty under consideration.88 Our focus 
is not on how the courts dealt with any challenges or which court ie we are not concerned 
                                                          
80 Crotty v. An Taoiseach [1987] IR 713.  The constitution was amended to ensure specifically that any Treaty 
adopting a common defence that would include Ireland has to be put to a referendum see Article 29.4.9 of the 
Irish Constitution. 
81 Article 42 Constitution of Austria; Article 87 Constitution of Croatia; Article 89 Constitution of the Republic of 
France; Article 8(3)(a) Foundational Law of Hungary; Article 46 Constitution of Ireland; Article 114 Constitution of 
Luxembourg; Article 66(3) Constitution of Malta; Articles 11(3), 147(3) and 151(3) Constitution of Romania; Article 
95(1) Constitution of Spain; Article 15 Instrument of Government (1974, amended to 2015) of Sweden (the 
referendum must be triggered by members of parliament).  See also note 25 above. 
82 See e.g. Hungary; Articles 75 and 138 Constitution of Italy; Article 148 Constitution of Lithuania; Article 235(6) 
Constitution of Poland. 
83 Article 163 Constitution of Estonia; Article 77 Constitution of Latvia. 
84 Austria and also Article 146 Constitution of Germany. 
85 M. Qvortrup ‘The three referendums on the European constitution treaty in 2005’ (2006) 77(1) The Political 
Quarterly 89–97. 
86 Robertson defines constitutional reviews as ‘a process by which one institution, commonly called a 
constitutional court, has the constitutional authority to decide whether states or other decrees created by the 
rule-making institutions identified by the constitution are valid given the terms of the constitution’. See D 
Robertson, The Judge as Political Theorist: Contemporary Constitutional Review (Princeton University Press, 2010) 
p. 5; T Ginsberg and M Versteeg ‘Why do countries adopt constitutional review?’ (2014) 20(3) Journal of Law, 
Economics, & Organization 587 
87 P J C Ortiz, EU Treaties and the Judicial Politics of National Courts: A Law and Politics Approach (London: 
Routledge 2015) p 8;  See also M Wendel ‘Lisbon before the courts: Comparative perspectives’ (2011) 7(1) 
European Constitutional Law Review 96-137. 
88 Ex poste constitutional review is (potentially) a form of treaty breaking rather than treaty-making although we 
note that 11 Member States allow for ex poste review. They are: Austria, Belgium, Croatia, the Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Italy, Lithuania, The Netherlands and The United Kingdom. 
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with the level of court where the case is initiated provided it can have an impact. Where 
review is to an advisory body but the constitutional norm is to follow that advice we regard it 
as having impact.89 Hence we explore what the potential is for court involvement. It is worth 
noting that this issue is of greater legal complexity than that of the role of parliaments and 
referendums because some of the law is judge made. Three broad categories can be 
identified. 
First, some Member States do not have ex ante review at all.90 Second, there are seven 
Member States that do not allow for review of the proposed EU treaty with the constitution.91 
Finally, in others, the Constitutional Court92 or a Constitutional Review Body that may or may 
not be quasi-judicial in nature93 may be called on to determine the compatibility of the EU 
treaty with the constitution. Undoubtedly the most prominent court in this regard is the 
German Constitutional Court which has extended standing rules and the scope of review to 
allow for constitutional review of EU treaties.94 One of the most significant issues is the scope 
of standing as the range of potential litigants is one factor in rendering constitutional review 
more likely. Where review is allowed, typically heads of state, members of parliament, or 
governments can refer cases to the constitutional court. As of 2016, five states allow citizens 
                                                          
89 See the Council on Legislation in Sweden whose advisory opinions are followed as a constitutional norm and 
compare the position in Belgium where the opinions of the Council of State are not necessarily followed by 
government. 
90 Austria, Belgium, Croatia, Italy Malta, The Netherlands.  See e.g. the decision of the Austrian Constitutional 
Court in case G 62/05 Constitutional Treaty, 18 June 2005; Case SV 2/08-3 et al Treaty of Lisbon, 30 September 
2008 and Case SV 1.10-9 Treaty of Lisbon II, 12 June 2010. See also M Wendel at note 89 above, p. 111. On Belgium 
see M Claes, The National Courts’ Mandate in the European Constitution (London, Bloomsbury 2006) p. 218; On 
Croatia see cases U-I-1583/2000 and U-I-559/2001 (decided in 2010) and U-I-2236/2017; On Italy see M Claes, 
ibid, p. 622. On the Netherlands see Article 120 of Constitution of the Kingdom of the Netherlands. Note however 
that an advisory opinion can be sought, see Article 73 of the Constitution of the Kingdom of the Netherlands and 
note 93 below 
91 Cyprus (Article 1a of the Constitution gives EU law supremacy over the constitution removing any ex ante review 
of treaties since 2006); Greece (constitutional review does not extend to treaties see M de Visser Constitutional 
Review In in Europe: A Comparative Analysis (Bloomsbury, 2013) p. 13; Denmark (Danish Supreme Court Case I-
361/1997, 6 April 1998 Carlsen v. Rasmussen. See also M Claes note 92, p 490. Luxembourg (Article 95, TER, 2, 
Constitution of Luxembourg (1868, as amended to 2009); Malta (Article 95, Constitution of Malta (1964, as 
amended to 2014)); The Netherlands (Article 120, Constitution of the Netherlands (1815, as amended to 2008)). 
92 Bulgaria see E Tanchev and M Belov ‘Constitutional gradualism: Adapting to EU membership and improving the 
judiciary in the Bulgarian Constitution’ (2009) 14(1) European Public Law 3–19; Constitution of the Czech Republic 
Article 87(2) and Article 97(2). See also the Constitutional Court Act 1993; the Estonian Constitutional Review 
Court Procedure Act 2002 allows for such review as does the Hungarian Act on the Constitutional Court 1989. 
Constitutional review is possible in Ireland either via a reference to the Court by the President under Article 26 of 
the Constitution or by a citizen, see Crotty v. An Taoiseach [1987] IR 713; Latvia s. 16(3) Constitutional Court Law; 
Lithuania Articles 105 and 107 Lithuanian Constitution; Poland, Article 133(2) of the Constitution; Portugal, 
Articles 134g and 278 of the Constitution; Romania, Article 146(2) of the Constitution; Slovakia, Article 125a(1) 
Constitution; Slovenia, Article 160 of the Constitution, Spain, Article 95(2) of the Constitution..  
93 Opinions are advisory in Belgium, Luxembourg (although constitutional change was only required once and 
followed see Article 83bis Constitution of Luxembourg); the Netherlands (Article 73 of the Constitution); followed 
as a constitutional norm in Sweden (Instrument of Government, ch. 8 Article 18).  They are binding in Finland 
(section 74 Constitution of Finland, Ojanen 2004 p. 205); France (Article 54 of the French Constitution). 
94 See eg German Federal Constitutional Court, Judgment of the Second Senate of 30 June 2009 - BvE 2/08; 
Manfred Brunner and Others v The European Union Treaty, Cases 2 BvR 2134/92 and 2159/92; German Federal 
Constitutional Court, Case BVerfGE 89, 155, Treaty of Maastricht, decision of 12 October 1993. 
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to bring actions.95 When the Treaty of Paris was being approved ex ante constitution review 
was only possible in one of the Member States. Now there is some scope for constitutional 
review in eighteen Member States with a major change to be seen in Cyprus - the only 
Member State where constitutional review became impossible. For others – including France, 
Germany, Ireland, Latvia and Slovakia the prospect of constitutional review of EU treaties 
increased underlying the greater role for courts in treaty-making in Europe. 
VI. THE CONSEQUENCES OF COMPLEX CONSENT 
The increased complexity of securing consent for EU treaties poses two questions. First, has 
it had an impact on the rate of treaty amendment?96 Second, how have the Member States 
responded to instances where a treaty is not approved at national level or was at risk of non-
approval. To answer the first question, it is necessary to look at treaty amendments on an 
article-by-article basis. This does not pick up on the significance of a change in a particular 
article (eg the introduction of Article 50 TEU allowing states to leave the EU), but it does give 
a sense of the increasing quantity of amendments. This is possible to do as each element of 
EU treaty amendments has its own CELEX number. Hence the Maastricht Treaty has more 
than 1,000 articles. This shows comprehensive treaty amendment followed by more 
piecemeal amendments, with the overall rate of amendment declining after the Treaties of 
Rome and again after Maastricht. As the treaties grow longer, they become more difficult to 
amend. Further regression analysis also shows that the rate of amendment slows as the 
people assume a more prominent role at consent stage, showing the long shadow of 
referendums on treaty making.97 The greater involvement of parliaments is more subtle with 
greater selectivity as to what is amended rather than the number of treaties. It is also worth 
noting that the involvement of courts has not led to a reduction in the rate of treaty 
amendment. This may reflect the more dialogic nature of the courts as institutions and their 
tendency not to stop treaties but to delay.   
                                                          
95 Germany, Ireland, Latvia and the UK. 
96 For an analysis of the question of constitutional amendment see note 55 above. On treaty amendments see K 
Conca, An Unfinished Foundation: The United Nations and Global Environmental Governance (Oxford University 
Press, 2015). On EU treaty amendments, see C Closa ‘Constitutional rigidity and procedures for ratifying 
constitutional reforms in EU member states’ in A Benz and F Knupling (eds) Changing Federal Constitutions: 
Lessons from International Comparison (Verlag Barbara Budrich, 2012) pp 281–310.   
97 For a detailed discussion of the regression analysis see note 10 above, pp. 221-240. On the long shadow of 
referendum see L Hooghe and G Marks, ‘A postfunctionalist theory of European integration: From permissive 
consensus to constraining dissensus’ (2009) 39(1) British Journal of Political Science 22.  
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Treaty Amendment Rate (Article-by-Article, 1952-2016) 
 
 
Source: Hodson and Maher (2018), p. 224. 
 
Turning to the second question,98 the European Defence Community Treaty is the best 
example of the Community abandoning a treaty after it had been rejected by domestic 
constituents, and, even so, it is not a clear-cut case. Signed in May 1952, this treaty had been 
approved by Germany and the Benelux countries by the time the French National Assembly 
rejected it in August 1954. In fact, the National Assembly did not vote down the treaty but 
made a motion to debate it, although it was accepted by deputies on this basis that the treaty 
had been defeated. The foreign ministers of the Six made no serious attempt to save the 
treaty after this vote for two reasons. The first is that the question of how to re-arm Germany, 
a key motivation for the European Defence Community Treaty, was urgent. Rather than wait 
for the Six to find a solution, the five signatories of the Brussels Treaty (1948) – Belgium, 
France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom – agreed to modify this 
agreement to allow for the creation of a new Western European Union to which Germany 
and Italy would accede. The second reason is that Pierre Mendes France, President of the 
Council of Ministers, had sought unsuccessfully to reopen negotiations on the European 
Defence Community Treaty prior to its consideration by the French National Assembly. 
Neither the Assembly nor the foreign ministers of the Six endorsed Mendes France’s proposed 
protocol. This left the government in an ambivalent position on the European Defence 
Community Treaty – which it put to parliament without formally requesting its approval – and 
without a mandate to renegotiate it. The rejection of the treaty was a defeat for the French 
government in one sense but a victory in another.99 
National parliaments, in spite of their increased role in treaty making, tend to support treaty 
amendments. The troubled passage of the Maastricht Treaty before the British parliament 
was the closest the Community came to the parliamentary defeat of a treaty since 1954. The 
                                                          
98 See note 10, pp. 221-240. 
99 International Organization, ‘European Defence Community’ (1954) 8(4) International Organization 599 - 601.  
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European Communities (Amendment) Act 1993, through which John Major’s government 
sought to give legal effect to the Maastricht Treaty, won a large majority in the House of 
Commons at third reading, albeit after opponents of the treaty had tabled more than 600 
amendments in an effort to derail the treaty. MPs continued to table amendments even after 
the act received Royal Assent, with the government losing a vote concerning the treaty’s 
Social Chapter. The day after its defeat, Major called a confidence vote on a revised resolution 
and won the support of MPs. This parliamentary siege of Maastricht, as David Baker, Andrew 
Gamble and Steve Ludlam call it, was spectacular but short lived.100 Although there was no 
shortage of parliamentary dissent over subsequent treaty amendments in the United 
Kingdom and elsewhere, no legislature has since come as close to vetoing a treaty 
amendment. 
Higher courts have shown a willingness to scrutinise EU treaties but with little appetite for 
precipitating involuntary defection. A possible exception in this regard is Ireland’s Supreme 
Court, which, in the Crotty case, ruled that Title III of the Single European Act required an 
amendment to Ireland’s constitution.101 In so doing, the Court upheld an appeal against the 
approval of the Single European Act via legislation alone, thus necessitating a referendum 
before the treaty could be ratified. In all probability, however, the Court neither sought nor 
expected to jeopardise the ratification of the treaty through this ruling. The Single European 
Act was predictably backed by a sizable majority of Irish voters, and it was only after the Irish 
government chose to run referendums on major treaty amendments rather than face similar 
challenges that ‘no’ votes in treaty-related referendums occurred.102 France’s Constitutional 
Court also left its mark on EU treaty making, albeit it with less dramatic effects. By ruling that 
the Maastricht Treaty required a constitutional amendment and concluding likewise in 
relation to the Amsterdam and Lisbon treaties, the Court raised the threshold for treaty 
amendments from a simple majority to a three-fifths majority requirement among the 
combined membership of the National Assembly and Senate.103 The higher threshold did not 
endanger the approval of these treaties, however, with the more consequential ‘petit oui’ for 
Maastricht and the ‘grand non’ against the European Constitution arising from presidential 
decisions to hold referendums. The German constitutional court has arguably taken the lead 
in this regard in the Maastricht and Lisbon Treaty judgments setting down a marker that 
revisions might at some stage require total revision of the Basic Law.104   
The risk of treaty rejections is greatest in relation to referendums. The issue is what happens 
where there is a no vote. Denmark’s initial ‘no’ to Maastricht was superseded by a ‘yes’ vote 
                                                          
100 D Baker, A Gamble and S Ludlam ‘The parliamentary siege of Maastricht 1993: Conservative divisions and 
British ratification’ (1994) 47(1) Parliamentary Affairs 37–61. 
101 Supreme Court of Ireland, Crotty v. An Taoiseach [1987] IR 713 (April 1987). 
102 D Hodson and I Maher ‘British Brinkmanship B brinkmanship and Gaelic Games: EU treaty ratification in the 
UK and Ireland from a two level game perspective’ (2014)  16(4) The British Journal of Politics & International 
Relations 645–61. 
103 French Constitutional Court, Decision 92–308 DC, Treaty on European Union; Decision 97–394 DC, Treaty of 
Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties establishing the European Communities and 
certain related instruments; Decision 2007–560 DC, Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and 
the Treaty establishing the European Community. 
104 BVerfGE 89, 155 12 October 1993 (Maastricht); 30 June 2009, 2 BvE 262-3 (Lisbon).  
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following an agreement to recognise certain exceptions for Denmark. All political parties had 
agreed the proposal and, even though the legal status of the exceptions was uncertain, they 
were sufficient to secure a positive response from the electorate.105 Similarly in the Irish no 
votes on Nice and Lisbon a similar approach was adopted with the EU not reopening the treaty 
but exceptions being negotiated and ultimately accepted by the people.106 The collapse of the 
European constitution followed a no vote by France and the Netherlands, with several states 
cancelling proposed referendums after these votes.107  
Member states’ increased recourse to international treaties provides another example of how 
the increased complexity of EU treaty making does not go hand in hand with flexibility. There 
is some evidence to suggest that EU leaders see international treaties as easier to win consent 
for in their own domestic arenas. In January 2012, Herman Van Rompuy floated the idea that 
the Fiscal Compact could be drafted in a way to obviate the need for either a referendum or 
parliamentary approval.108 In point of fact, this proposal sought to transform the Fiscal 
Compact from an exercise in treaty making to one of legislation by activating a provision in 
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union that allows the Council to amend 
Protocol No. 12, which concerns the excessive deficit procedure, by means of a special 
legislative procedure.109 Although Van Rompuy’s trial balloon quickly burst, the idea that the 
Fiscal Compact would not necessitate approval via the usual channels persisted. Cyprus broke 
from EU treaty-making norms by approving this agreement by means of government decree 
rather than an Act of the House of Representatives.110 Ireland’s break from EU treaty-making 
norms proved less successful. Having routinely put significant EU treaty amendments to a 
referendum since Maastricht, the Irish government initially refused to be drawn on whether 
the people would be offered a vote on the Fiscal Compact.111 In the end, the government 
followed the Attorney General’s advice that a referendum was required,112 which was 
approved by a margin of 60.3 per cent to 39.7 per cent. 
 
VII. TWO THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON TREATY REFORM 
                                                          
105 H Krunke ‘From Maastricht to Edinburgh:  The Danish Solution’ (2005) 1(3) European Constitutional Law Review 
342; R van Ooik and D Curtin, Denmark and the Edinburgh Summit: Maastricht without Tears (Wiley Chancery 
Law, 1994) p. 354. 
106 See K. Gilland at note 78 above; See also B. Laffan and J. O’Mahony, at note 80 above, p 108. 
107 See M-L, Paris-Dobozy ‘The Implications of the ‘No’ Vote in France: Making the Most of a Wasted Opportunity’ 
in F Laursen (ed) The Rise and Fall of the EU’s Constitutional Treaty (Brill, 2008) p. 510; The Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Ireland, Poland and Portugal all cancelled their referendums see note 10, p. 232. 
108 J Chaffin, ‘Van Rompuy draws up fast-track ‘fiscal compact’ Financial Times (7 December 2011) 
109 Article 126(14) TFEU. 
110 P Pantazatou, Constitutional Change Through Euro Crisis Law (European University Institute, 2014) p. 38;   See 
note 10 above, pp. 87-120. 
111 J Cienski, J Smyth and P Spiegel, ‘Sinn Fein legal threat hangs over fiscal deal’ Financial Times (20 January 2012). 
112  H Stewart and H McDonald, ‘Ireland set for referendum on eurozone fiscal treaty’ The Guardian (28 February 
2012). 
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Robert Putnam’s seminal two-level game approach explores how domestic and international 
politics are entangled.113 This approach allows for the possibility that governments in treaty 
negotiation may choose to tie their hands domestically in order to restrict the range of 
possible outcomes at the negotiations.114 A government that ties its hands too tightly, Putnam 
warns, could produce deadlock in negotiations.115 A corollary to this point is that governments 
that find their ability to make treaties encumbered by the consent stage have a strong 
incentive to find slack either by changing or circumventing domestic constraints.  
From a two-level game perspective, concerns that Member States have tied their hands too 
tightly through more complex constitutional rules and norms is understandable. Calls to end 
the unanimity requirement for approving EU treaties and to limit the use of national 
referendums are consistent with this view. Among academic commentators, Fernando 
Mendez, Mario Mendez and Vasiliki Triga offer the most thoughtful proposals. One, inspired 
by the 1984 Draft Treaty on European Union, would allow a supermajority at both the 
negotiation and consent stages of treaty making, which the authors suggest could overcome 
‘the paralysis and stagnation’ of treaty making in an enlarged Union.116 As regards 
referendums, Mendez, Mendez and Triga see such votes as ‘extra territorial’, because of the 
significant consequences generated by voters in one Member State on the rest of the Union. 
Carlos Closa makes a similar point when he argues that the rejection of a treaty generates 
negative externalities for other Member States, as occurred in the Exchange Rate Mechanism 
crisis triggered by Denmark’s ‘no’ vote against the Maastricht Treaty in 1992.117 
The two-level legitimacy approach sees the privileged position of national governments in 
international diplomacy as being contested.118 The rise of parliaments, the people and courts 
in the negotiation and consent stages of EU treaty making are a response to, and reflection 
of, this contestation. As such, attempts to reassert national governments’ privileged position 
by circumventing the role of other actors in the consent stage could trigger a backlash. A 
degree of inertia in constitutional amendment procedures can be necessary and desirable if 
it bolsters the legitimacy of constitutional law as a form of lex superior.119 There is a similar 
case for building in further inertia to EU treaty making, for making it harder for Member States 
to circumvent parliaments, the people and courts, for accepting that treaty making can and 
should occasionally fail to produce agreements in spite of the diplomatic sunk costs involved. 
‘Is it right’, Hervé Bribosia asks, that the refusal of a few hundred thousand inhabitants should 
be allowed to block a reform desired by the representatives of five hundred million 
                                                          
113 R Putnam, ‘Diplomacy and domestic politics: The logic of two-level games’ (1988) 42(3) International 
Organization 430.  See note 10, pp. 246-267. 
114 A Morascsik ‘Armaments among Allies: European Weapons Collaboration, 1975–1985’ in P B Evans, H K 
Jacobson and R Putnam (eds), Double-Edged Diplomacy: International Bargaining and Domestic Politics 
(University of California Press, 1993) p. 128. 
115 See note 116, p. 441. 
116 See note 2, p. 203. 
117 See note 1, p. 13. 
118 See note 10, pp. 34-49. 
119 J E Lane, Constitutions and political theory (Manchester University Press, 1996) p 114. 
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people?’120 Where legitimacy is a primary consideration, the answer, is ‘yes’. The consent to 
be bound is a defining principle of treaty making between sovereign states. In practice, new 
treaties do not typically enter into force unless the parties to it have expressed their consent 
to be bound.121 The question of consent for treaty amendments is more intricate. Under the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, an amendment to a multilateral treaty cannot bind 
a state that is party to the original treaty without that state having become a party to the 
amending agreement.122 In practice, multilateral treaties often include standard amendment 
procedures that allow a qualified majority of parties to amend the existing treaties, but states 
that oppose such amendments typically cannot be bound by such amendments against their 
will.123 Multilateral treaties sometimes include simplified amendment procedures, which in 
some cases allow for a majority of states to approve amendments that apply to all parties to 
the original agreement, whether they have given their consent to be bound by such changes 
or not or by allowing or compelling non-consenting states to withdraw from the treaty.124 
Insofar as the regulation of referendums can be justified from a two-level legitimacy 
perspective it would be to discourage the EU’s tendency to overlook referendum results, as 
occurred in the re-run referendums over Maastricht, Nice and Lisbon and the willingness to 
salvage much of the European Constitution in spite of referendum votes against it. There are 
arguments in favour of second referendums. Sinnott, for example, finds a marked increase in 
both communication and understanding in Ireland’s re-run referendum on the Nice Treaty.125 
But this practice is all too easily criticised, as Gráinne De Búrca notes, for failing ‘to respect 
the outcome of legitimate constitutional processes and [undermining] the democratically 
expressed will of the people’.126 Stephen Tierney goes further by seeing second referendums 
as sending a clear message ‘that national electorates will not be allowed to frustrate closer 
integration’.127  
Other ideas for making EU treaties harder to amend, include time-locks on treaty reform, 
citizen-led treaty making and greater oversight of treaty making. The simplest form of time 
lock would be to limit the number of treaty amendments that can occur within a particular 
time period. The Treaty of Paris included such a provision by prohibiting amendments to itself 
until a five-year transition period had expired.128 One way of giving citizens a say would be to 
hold periodic pan-European referendums on whether to amend EU treaties, for example, 
every five years. As regards greater oversight, there is a case for routinely inviting the Court 
of Justice to give an opinion on whether the use of the simplified revision procedure over the 
                                                          
120 H Bribosia ‘Revising the European Treaties: A Plea in Favour of Abolishing the Veto’ (2009). Policy Paper No. 
37, Notre Europe, p 14. 
121 See note 11 above, p 677. 
122 Article 40, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, 1115 UNTS, 331. 
123 See note 11, pp. 744–8. 
124 Ibid, p. 749. 
125 R Sinnott, Attitudes and Behaviour of the Irish Electorate in the Second Referendum on the Treaty of Nice 
(Institute for the Study of Social Change, 2003). 
126 G De Burca, ‘If at First You Don't Succeed: Vote, Vote Again: Analyzing the Second Referendum Phenomenon 
in EU Treaty Change’ (2009) 33(5) Fordham International Law Journal 1475-6. 
127 S Tierney, Constitutional Referendums: The Theory and Practice of Republican Deliberation (Oxford University 
Press, 2012) p 165. 
128 Article 96, Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (Paris, 1951). 
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ordinary revision procedure is justified rather than waiting for a reference from a national 
higher court. There is a similar case for making the use of the simplified revision procedure 
subject to the consent of the European Parliament, as occurs when the European Council 
seeks to employ the ordinary revision procedure without convening a convention. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
Who makes treaties and how such actors are held to account are recurring concerns in the 
study of international law.129 Few instances of treaty making can match the EU for intensity 
and controversy. During the period 2010–2011 alone, EU Member States launched a 
combined 105 national consent procedures connected to treaty amendments.130 Once 
thought of as epoch-making events, treaty amendments are now part of the ‘everyday 
politics’ of the EU, argues Thomas Christiansen.131 And yet treaties are no less controversial 
for this. The approval of the Maastricht Treaty, which was rejected by Danish voters in a 
referendum and only narrowly endorsed by their French counterparts, intensified popular 
concerns over EU treaty change.132 Thirteen years later, referendums on the European 
Constitution in France and the Netherlands produced a popular backlash against a treaty that 
was designed to bring the EU closer to its people.133 The United Kingdom had planned to hold 
a referendum on this treaty, but its failure to do so on earlier or later agreements goes some 
way towards explaining why Prime Minister David Cameron called and lost a referendum in 
2016 on the United Kingdom’s continued membership of the EU. 
The EU is an important case not only because its treaties are in flux but because the process 
through which Member States give their consent to be bound to such agreements has 
changed. In 1951, ten parliamentary chambers participated in the approval of the Treaty of 
Paris. All Member States approved this agreement by means of a simple majority vote; there 
were no referendums or ex-ante constitutional reviews. By 2016, the comparative 
                                                          
129 G A Finch, ‘The need to restrain the treaty-making power of the United States within constitutional limits’ 
(1954) 48(1) The American Journal of International Law 57–82; B. A. D. M. McNair, The Law of Treaties ( Oxford 
University Press 1961); J Lobel ‘The limits of constitutional power: Conflicts between foreign policy and 
international law’ (1985) 71(1) Virginia Law Review 1071–180; M Kumm and V F Comella ‘The primacy clause of 
the constitutional treaty and the future of constitutional conflict in the European Union’ (2005) 3 International 
Journal of Constitutional Law 473; O A Hathaway ‘Presidential Power Over International Law: Restoring the 
Balance’ (2009) 119(2) The Yale Law Journal 140–268. 
130 Four treaty revisions where launched during this period. They concerned; (1) The transitional arrangements 
on the number of Members of the European Parliament which was carried out via the ordinary revision procedure. 
(2) The revision of Article 136 TFEU, which permitted the establishment of the European Stability Mechanism, 
was carried out via the simplified revision procedure. (3) The accession of Croatia to the EU falls outside the 
simplified and ordinary revision procedures and is instead governed by Article 49 TEU. (4) Ireland’s Lisbon 
protocols were ratified via the ordinary revision procedure. A treaty change concerning the Czech Republic’s ‘opt 
out’ out from the Charter on Fundamental Rights – an eleventh-hour concession secured by President Václav 
Klaus in December 2009 before he agreed to sign the Lisbon Treaty – was postponed as a result of domestic 
wrangling. 
131 T Christiansen, ‘Institutionalist Dynamics behind the New Intergovernmentalism: The Continuous Process of 
EU Treaty Reform’ in C J Bickerton, D Hodson, and U Puetter (eds) The New Intergovernmentalism: States and 
Supranational Actors in the Post-Maastricht Era (Oxford University Press, 2015) p. 95. 
132 M Franklin, M Marsh and M McLaren ‘Uncorking the bottle: Popular opposition to European unification in the 
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133 See note 86 above.  
19 
 
constitutional analysis presented in this article has shown, forty-four parliamentary chambers 
were involved in approving major EU treaties and most Member States required approval by 
a parliamentary majority of two-fifths or more. Referendums were either possible or probable 
in twenty-two Member States and there was scope for the ex-ante constitutional review of 
EU treaties in eighteen Member States.  
EU treaty making has become more complex but such complexity has not produced gridlock 
and does not necessarily argue for greater flexibility in the ways that Member States give their 
consent to be bound. Parliaments and national higher courts, though influential, tend to 
approve treaties. Member States, meanwhile, generally work around referendum votes 
against EU treaties rather than abandoning such agreements. As EU treaty making has 
become more complex, Member States have also turned increasingly to international law 
treaties, in part because they are perceived as being easier to approve.  
Arguments in favour of EU treaty making becoming more flexible rest uneasily with these 
findings but chime with Robert Putnam’s two-level game approach. Member states that tie 
their hands too tightly in the consent stage of treaty making, it follows, should seek more 
room for manoeuvre in the domestic arena or risk rejecting treaties. The two-level legitimacy 
approach, in contrast, warns against untying hands without understanding the reasons why 
they have been tied to begin with. It argues for less rather than more flexibility in the consent 
stage, with time locks on treaty reforms, citizen-led treaty making and greater oversight of 
treaty having the potential to incorporate further inertia into EU treaty making. 
 
 
 
 
